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SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT .OF ARBITRATION CONTRACTS
SIDNEY P. SIMPSONt

Arbitration as a method of settling disputes has a long and honorable
history.' Agreements to arbitrate existing controversies have been held
valid at common law from an early date, 2 as have arbitration clauses in contracts applying to disputes arising under such contracts.3 And once an award
has been made pursuant to an arbitration agreement, equity will enforce it
specifically if a contract between the parties in the same terms as the award
would be specifically enforceable. 4 Thus, an award requiring the conveyance
of land will be specifically enforced, 5 while one which calls merely for the
payment of money will not be, because the remedy at law is adequate." In a
7
suit in equity to enforce an award, discretionary defenses such as mistake,
hardship,' or lack of mutuality of performance 9 are available to the
defendant.
Where, however, the agreement to arbitrate is still executory, different
considerations arise; and the doctrine is well established that, in the absence
of statute, "courts of equity will never entertain a suit to compel parties
specifically to perform an agreement to submit to arbitration." 10 Clearly
this doctrine does not rest on the ground that the legal remedy for the breach
of an arbitration contract is adequate, since, unless the plaintiff has been put
t A. B., Knox College, 1917; LL. B., Harvard University, 1922; Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; member of the New York Bar; co-editor (with Zechariah Chafee, Jr.) of
CASES ON EQUITY (1934).
I. See Bentwich, Chambers of Arbitration (1893) 95 L. T. 524; COHEN, CoMERCI.L
ARBITRATION AND THE LAW (9,8) 53-308; Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration
Law (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 595, 596-612; The Growth of Arbitration (1929) 67 L. J. 251.
For a general account of the history of commercial arbitration law in the United States, see
Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States (1928) 12
MINN. L. REV. 240.

2. See Livingston v. Ralli, 5 E. & B. 132 (Q. B. 1855); Pond v. Harris, 113 Mass. 114
(1873) ; STURGES, COMMEmRCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS (1930) § 84.
3. But see Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. 152, 139 N. E. 95 (1923) ; Conant v. Arsenault,
119 Me. 411, 11I Atl. 378 (1920).

Cf. STURGES, op. cit. supra note 2, §22.

4. See Hall v. Hardy, 3 P. Wins. 187 (Ch. 1733) ; Jones v. Boston Mill Corp., 4 Pick.
507 (Mass. 1827). See also Ballance v. Underhill, 4 Ill. 453, 459 (1842) ; Bremer Oeltransport
G. In. b. H. v. Drewry, [1933] I K. B. 753, 758.
5. See, e. g., Pawling v. Jackman, 5 Litt. I (Ky. 1795) ; Boyd's Heirs v. Magruder's
Heirs, 2 Rob. 761 (Va. 1844) ; Myers v. Easterwood, 6o Tex. 1O7 (1883).
6. Howe v. Nickerson, 14 Allen 400 (Mass. 1867). See also Hall v. Hardy, 3 P. Wins.
187, I9O (Ch. 1733) (reporter's note) ; Story v. Norwich & Worcester R. R., 24 Conn. 94,
114 (1855); Turpin v. Banton, Hardin 312, 313 (Ky. i8o8); Bubier v. Bubier, 24 Me. 42
(money
(1844). Compare Memphis & Charleston R. R. v. Scruggs, 50 Miss. 284 (874)
award to be secured by lien on land).
7. See Ballance v. Underhill, 4 Ill. 453, 459 (1852).
8. See Nickels v. Hancock, 7 DeG. M. & G. 300, 314 (Ch. 1855).
9. See Blackett v. Bates, L. R. I Ch. App. 117 (1865) ; Gervais v. Edwards, 2 Dr. & W.
8o (Ir. 1842).
iO. Selden, J., in Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N. Y. 491, 496 (1858). The leading American
case is Tobey v. County of Bristol, 3 Story 8oo (C. C. D. Mass. 1845), one of the last decisions of Mr. Justice Story. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. lo9, 120
(1923) ; Conner v. Drake, I Ohio St. 166, 68 (1853).
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to expense by reason of the defendant's refusal to arbitrate, he can recover
only nominal damages at law;11 and, although the early common law
doctrine was otherwise, 12 it is impossible to avoid this rule of damages by
making the arbitration agreement in the form of a penal bond.1 3
The refusal of courts of equity specifically to enforce arbitration contracts in spite of the manifest inadequacy of the legal remedy for their breach
has been rested on various grounds. It has been said that if the court were
to order the defendant to name an arbitrator, it could not compel the execution of its decree;- 4 that even if the appointment of arbitrators could be
enforced, the arbitrators so appointed could not be compelled to act as such
or to agree ;15 and that if the court were to appoint arbitrators, it would "bind
the Parties contrary to their Agreement".' 6 None of these grounds seems
sufficient. The ordinary processes of a court of equity will be adequate in
the usual case to compel the defendant to appoint an arbitrator; if the arbitrator so appointed refuses to act (and to act in good faith), the court can
compel the defendant to appoint another; and, moreover, there would seem
to be no objection to an appointment by the court where the defendant has
refused to appoint in accordance with his agreement, since it may well be said
that he must be taken to have waived his right of selection.' 7 More substantial, perhaps, is the argument that, since lay arbitration tribunals do not have
the facilities for investigation nor the knowledge of applicable legal principles
which the courts possess, a court of equity should not compel a party to
submit the determination of his rights to such a tribunal.' s In reply to this
argument it may be said: (i) This is just what the parties have agreed to
do, and, unless there exists some public policy against extrajudicial setttlement of controversies, that agreement should be respected and enforced.
(2) In a considerable number of jurisdictions, general arbitration statutes
now authorize compulsory process to obtain evidence in common law arbitrations, and thus eliminate the difficulty in part.' 9
ii. Munson v. Straits of Dover S. S. Co., ioz Fed. 926 (C. C. A. 2d, i9oo); 2 WILis§§ 1719, 1927. See Doleman & Sons v. Ossett Corp., [1912] 3 K. B.
257, 268; Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foderstof Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, 250
Fed. 935, 937 (C. C. A. 2d, I9i8), aff'd sub one. The Atlanten, 252 U. S. 313 (1920). Cf.
McCullough v. Clinch-Mitchell Construction Co., 71 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
12. See Vynior's Case, 8 Co. 8ib (K. 1. 16o9) ; COHEN, op. cit. supra note I, 148-152.
TON, CONTRACTS (1920)

13. See Allen v. Watson, 16 Johns. 204, 2o9 (N. Y. 1819).
14. See Tobey v. County of Bristol, 3 Story 8oo, 825 (C. C. D. Mass. 1845).

See also the
argument for the defendant in Agar v. Macklew, 2 Sine. & Stu. 418 (Ch. 1825) (an appraisal
case).

15. See Crawshay v. Collins, 1 Swanst. 40 (Ch. 1818) ; McGunn v. Havlin, 29 Mich. 476,
481 (1874) ; Pillow v. Pillow's Heirs, 3 Humph. 644, 646 (Tenn. 1842). Cf. CLARK, EQurry

(1919) § 64.

16. Sir John Leach, V. C., in Agar v. Macklew, 2 SiM. & Stu. 418, 425 (Ch. 1825). See
Tobey v. County of Bristol, 3 Story 8oo, 825 (C. C. D. Mass. 1845).
17. But see Paris v. Grieg, 12 Hawaii 274, 281 (1899). Cf. Hayes, Specific Performance
of Contractsfor Arbitrationor Valuation (1916) i CoR. L. Q. 225, 236.
i8. This argument is fully developed by Mr. Justice Story in Tobey v. County of Bristol,
3 Story 8oo, 821-822 (C. C. D. Mass. 1845).
ig. See STURGEs, op. cit. supra note 2, § 153 et seq.
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The sound ground for the accepted equity doctrine that courts of chancery will not specifically enforce contracts to arbitrate is to be found in the
common law character and effect of such contracts. A contract to arbitrate,
although valid at common law, is "revocable". In other words, either party
to the contract is regarded as having a power to break it, although rendering
himself liable (in nominal damages at least) for so doing.20 This power of
revocation has two important effects at law: (i) If a party "revokes" (i. e.,
breaks) his contract to arbitrate, even after arbitrators have been appointed,
no valid award can be made. 2 1 (2) The breach of an agreement to arbitrate
cannot be pleaded as a defense to an action brought by the party who has
broken ("revoked") that agreement. 22 This characteristic of "revocability"
parties have expressly contracted not
exists at common law evefi though the
23
arbitrate.
to revoke the agreement to
The common law rule that arbitration agreements are "revocable"
24
appears to have had its origin in a dictum of Lord Coke in Vynior's Case.
2. it
While it is doubtful whether this dictumi accurately stated the early law,
has been regarded as setting forth the common law rule.2 6 The basic reason
behind the rule, and the cause of the general acceptance of the dictum in
Vynior's Case, appears to have been the theory that arbitration agreements,
while not absolutely illegal, were opposed to public policy because they tended
to oust the courts of jurisdiction, 27 and so violated "the spirit of the laws
creating the courts". 28 It is perhaps not too much to say with the late Judge
Hough, that: "A more unworthy genesis [for the rule of revocability] cannot be imagined", 29 and that "it is surely a singular view of judicial sanctity
which reasons that, because the Legislature has made a court, therefore everybody must go to the court". 3" As an original question, it would seem, the
common law courts might well have held arbitration agreements to be irrevSee STURGES, op. cit. supranote 2, §§ 15, 76.
See, e. g., Boston & Lowell R. R. Corp. v. Nashua & Lowell R. R. Corp., 139 Mass.
463, 31 N. E. 751 (885) ; Jones v. Harris, 59 Miss. 214 (1881). In Pennsylvania, however,
even prior to the passage of the present Pennsylvania arbitration statute [PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1930) tit. 5,§§ 161-181; cf. note 78, ifra], an agreement to arbitrate was held not
to be "revocable" in this sense if the arbitrators were named in the agreement. Adinolfi v.
Hazlett, 242 Pa. 25, 88 Atl. 869 (1913).
22. See, e. g., Kill v. Hollister, I Wils. 129 (K. B. 1746) ; Haggart v. Morgan, 5 N. Y.
See Mit422 (I85I) ; W. H. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 19a Cal. 665, 214 Pac. 38 (1923).
chell v. Harris, 2 Ves. t29a (Ch. 1793) ; Street v. Rigby, 6 Ves. 814 (Ch. 78o2). And see
Thos. W. -Finucane Co. v. Board of Education, i9o N. Y. 76, 83, 82 N. E. 737, 739 (1907).
23. See People e.x -el. Union Ins. Co. v. Nash, III N. Y. 310, 315, 18 N. E. 630 (1888).
24. 8 Co. Soa, 8ib (K. B. 16o9). See COHE-N, op. cit. supra note I, at 84-93.
25. See COHEN, op. cit. supra note I, 103-127.
26. For collections of cases on the validity and effect of contracts to arbitrate at common law, see Notes (1892) 15 L. R. A. 142; (1911) 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 337.
27. See Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 811, 853 (1856) ; Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall.
See also I STORY,
445, 452 (U. S. 1874) ; Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N. Y. 377, 379 (1868).
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (13th ed. 1886) § 670.
28. See U. S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. ioo6, ioo9
(S. D. N. Y. 1915).
29. Id. at ioo6.
30. Id. at ioog-IoIo.
20.
21.
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ocable. But they did not, and the law has long since crystallized. One
exception, it is true, has been engrafted upon the "revocability" rule. In
England, if the parties to a contract containing an arbitration clause agree
that compliance with this clause shall be a condition precedent to a suit on
31 The
the main contract, the courts will give full effect to this agreement.
American courts have refused to go so far; they give effect to an agreement
that arbitration shall be a condition precedent to suit if the arbitration clause
32
relates only to the ascertainment of value or some other matter of fact, but
not if the contemplated arbitration is to decide the entire question of liability. 33 Even where effect is thus given to an arbitration clause, it is
made operative only to bar a suit on the main contract without compliance
with the clause; and this does not prevent either party from preventing an
award either by refusing to appoint arbitrators or by revoking their authority
after appointment.
In consequence of the common law rule of the revocability of arbitration
contracts, a court of equity which is asked to enforce specifically an agreement
to arbitrate finds itself in this position: If it grants the relief sought by the
plaintiff and compels the defendant to appoint arbitrators, the defendant can
render the decree nugatory forthwith by revoking the arbitrators' authority.
If the equity court should enjoin such revocation of authority, it would be
refusing to follow the law in a case in its concurrent jurisdiction " and
would be setting up a special equity rule as to the character and effect of
35 And if the court
arbitration agreements-a thoroughly undesirable result.
should appoint arbitrators for the defendant, it again would be refusing to
follow the law, and would, in a sense, "bind the Parties contrary to their
31. Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 811 (1856) ; Woodall v. Pearl Assurance Co., [1919] I
K. B. 593. Cf. Dreyfuss & Co. v. Atlantic Shipping & Trading Co., 37 T. L. R. 417 (Ct. App.
I92I), noted in (1921) 30 YALE L. J.862.
32. See, e. g., Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 154 Ill. 9, 39 N. E. 11o2 (1894) ; Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 5o N. Y. 250 (1872). A leading case
is Stephenson v. Piscataqua Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 54 Me. 55 (1866) ; cf. Fisher v. Merchants Ins. Co., 95 Me. 486, 50 Atl. 282 (1goi). See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920)
§§ 1721-1722.
33. See, e.g., Whitney v. National Masonic Accident Assn., 52 Minn. 378, 54 N. W. 184
(1893) ; Meacham v. Jamestown, Franklin & Clearfield R. R., 211 N. Y. 346, io5 N. E. 653
(1914) ; Tatsuuma Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prescott, 4 F. (2d) 67o (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
Cf. Burnham, Arbitration as a ConditionPrecedent (1897) II HARv. L. REV. 234.
34. See Tobey v. County of Bristol, 3 Story 8oo, 824 (C. C. D. Mass. 1845): "When the
law has declared, that any agreement for an arbitration is, in its very nature, revocable, and
cannot be made irrevocable by any agreement of the parties, Courts of Equity are bound to
respect this interposition, and are not at liberty to decree that to be positive and absolute in its
obligation, which the law declares to be conditional and countermandable." See also STURGES,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 357. Cf. Ellington v. Currie, 193 N. C. 61o, 137 S.E. 869 (1927) ;
Electrical Research Products v. Vitaphone Corp., 171 Atl. 738, 749-753 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1934),
rev'g Vitaphone Corp. v. Electric Research Products, ig Del. Ch. 354, 167 At. 845 (933),
(1933) 47 HARV. L. RaV. 126.
35. Compare the established doctrine that equity will not grant specific performance unless there is a valid and enforceable contract at law. See Marquis of Normanby v. Duke of
562
Devonshire, Freem. Ch. 215, 216 (16o7) ; Crampton v. Varna Ry. Co., L. R. 7 Ch. App.
(1872) ; Hedges v. Dixon County, 15o U. S.182, 192 (1893). Cf. 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JualsPRUDENCE (4th ed. I919) § 1403, n. I.
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Agreement".30 Following the law, therefore, courts of equity, if they
attempted specifically to enforce arbitration agreements, would be in the same
position as if they were to attempt specifically to enforce any other contract
which the defendant had a power immediately to terminate. The defendant
could render nugatory the court's decree as soon as it was rendered; and it
has long been an established doctrine of equity that specific performance will
not be granted under such circumstances. 37 In other words, specific performance of arbitration contracts is refused because "the court will . . refuse
to interfere in any case where, if it were to do so, one of the parties might
nullify its action through the exercise of a discretion which the contract or
the law invests him with". 38 This is not to say that courts of equity, in
denying specific performance of contracts to arbitrate, have not in the past
been influenced by old ideas of public policy as to "ousting the jurisdiction
of the courts"; but rather that, even though this ghost be laid, there is nevertheless a sound ground for the refusal of equity specifically to enforce such
contracts in view of their "revocability" at law.
The real difficulty in specifically enforcing agreements to arbitrate is thus
not on the equity side of the courts at all. Granted a change in the common
law rule, there is nothing (except the numbing effect of precedent) to prevent
equity from enforcing specific performance of arbitration agreements on the
ground of inadequacy of the legal remedy for the breach thereof, subject, of
course, to the exercise of the chancellor's judicial discretion in accordance
with the principles applied in other specific performance cases.
The common law rule of "revocability" of arbitration agreements is so
entrenched in the cases that it can be changed only by legislation; but modem
legislation has gone far to change it. Moreover, that legislation in some
instances has purported to impose upon the courts a mandatory duty of
specifically enforcing arbitration contracts. In order to understand the
present state of the law as to the specific enforcement of such contracts, an
analysis of the character and an appraisal of the effect of this legislation is
therefore necessary.

The earliest important legislative enactment relating to arbitration was
an English statute of 1698 39 which authorized the parties to an agreement
36. See note i6, supra. But cf. p. I6i, supra.
37. See, e. g., Wheeler v. Trotter, 3 Swanst. 174, n. (a) (Ch.1737) ; Gregory v. Wilson, 9 Hare 683 (Ch. I85i) ; Brett v. East India & London Shipping Co., 2 Hem. & M. 404
(Ch. 1864) ; Hurlburt v. Kantzler, 112 Ill. 482 (884) ; Snyder v. Greaves, 21 Atl. 291 (N. J.
Ch. i89i) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 377. See also Andrews v. Andrews, 28 Ala.
432, 443 (1856) ; Gerling v. Lain, 269 Ill. 337, 341, io9 N. E. 972, 974 (1915) ; Alworthv, Seymour, 42 Minn. 526, 528, 44 N. W. 1030 (89o) ; New River Lbr. Co. v. Tennessee Ry.,
145 Tenn. 266, 295, 238 S. W. 867, 875 (1921). And see Express Co. v. Railroad Co., 99 U. S.
See also the decisions refusing specific performance of contracts to form
191, 200 (878).
partnerships to continue at the will of the parties, e. g., Hercy v. Birch, 9Yes. 357 (Ch. 1804) ;
Clark v. Truitt, 183 Ill. 239, s5 N. E. 683 (1899) ; Buck v. Smith, 29 Mich. II6 (874) ;
Wilcox v. Williams, 92 Hun 250, 36 N. Y. Supp. 944 (4th Dep't 1895).
38. Cooley, J., in Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich. 449, 455, ii N. W. 265, 267 (1882).
39. 9 & 1o Wm. III, c. is (1698).
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to arbitrate to insert a provision therein that the award might be made a rule
of any court of record on the application of either party. If made a rule
of court, refusal to perform the award was punishable as a contempt. This
statute did not, however, make arbitration agreements irrevocable, nor did
it provide for court appointment of arbitrators. By the Common Law
Amendment Act of 1833,4 o the authority of arbitrators when appointed was
made irrevocable without leave of court; and the Common Law Procedure
Act of 1854 41 authorized any court to stay proceedings brought in violation
of any agreement to arbitrate existing or future disputes, 42 provided for the
appointment of arbitrators by the court in the event of the failure of a party
to do so, the death of an arbitrator, or other specified contingencies,- 3 and
authorized ex parte arbitrations where the parties were each to appoint an
arbitrator and one of them failed to do so. 44 The provisions of these statutes
were incorporated in the Arbitration Act, 1889, 45 which further provided
46
that an arbitrator or arbitrators may, and, if the court directs, must, state

a special case for the opinion of the court on any question of law arising in
been extenthe course of the proceedings. 4T Arbitration under this Act has
48
cases.
commercial
in
especially
utilized,
successfully
and
sively
Arbitration legislation in the United States has had a somewhat different
history. All but two of the states 49 have had arbitration statutes from a
comparatively early date; but, prior to 192o, none of these statutes in terms
made agreements to arbitrate future disputes irrevocable 'o nor did they pro40. 3 & 4 WM. IV, c. 42, §39 (833).
41. 17 & 18 Vicr., c. 125 (854).

42. Id. § I. As to the effect of the similar provision of the ARBITRTION Act, 1889, 52 &
53 VICr., c. 49, § 4, see Doleman & Sons v. Ossett Corp., [1912] 3 K. B. 257, 266.
43. 17 & IS VIC., c. 125, § 12 (1854).
44.Id. § 13.
45. 52 & 53 VICT., c. 49 (889), amended in I92o by the ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
ACT, I920, io & ii GEo. V, c. 8I, § I6, and during the present year' by the ARBITRATION
ACT, 1934, 24 & 25 GEo. V, c. x4, in effect January I, 1935. See also ARBITRATION
CLAUSES (PROTOCOL) ACT, 1924, 14 & I5 GEo. V, c. 39, discussed in Note (1925), 159 L. T.
130; ARBITRATION (FOREIGN AWARDS) ACT, 193o, 2o GEO. V, c. 15. See Creswell, The Arbitration Acts, Z889 to 5934, (934) 8 J. INST. ARBITRATORS (N. S.) 35.
See also id. § 7 (b). If a party to an arbitra46. 52 & 53 VICT., c. 49, § I9 (889).
tion desires to have a special case stated and the arbitrators fail or refuse to do so, he may
apply to the court for an order directing the arbitrators to state a case. See RussELI#,
POWER AND DUTY OF AN ARBITRATOR (12th ed. 193) 319.
47. An agreement by the parties to an arbitration that the arbitrators shall not be required to state a special case is held to be against public policy and void. Czarnikow v.
Roth, Schmidt & Co., [1922] 2 K. B. 478. See RUSSELL, op. cit. supra note 46, at 78-82, 316318. Cf. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration (1934) 47
HAzv. L. RaV. 590, 61o-613.

48. See ROSENBAUM, A

REPORT OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,

AM.

JUD.

Soc. BULL.

XII (1916).
49. There are no general arbitration statutes in Oklahoma and South Dakota.
5o. In Illinois, a statute enacted in 1919 [ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 10, § 31, making any "submission to arbitration" irrevocable unless expressly made revocable, has been
held applicable to agreements to submit existing disputes to arbitration, and constitutional as
so applied. White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek, 296 Ill. 240, 129 N. E. 753 (i92o). But it
has been held inapplicable to general agreements to arbitrate all future disputes of whatever
nature which may arise between the parties to the agreement. Cocalis v. Nazlides, 3o8 Ill. 152,
Cf. AaIz. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4300, in force since 1901,
139 N. E. 95 (923).
as amended by Ariz. Laws 1929, C.72.
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vide for the court appointment of arbitrators if a party to an agreement in
an existing dispute failed to appoint as agreed;"l they related rather to the
method of enforcing awards, and frequently provided for the judicial con2
firmation or setting aside thereof.
The pioneer American statute designed effectively to enforce arbitration
agreements is the New York Arbitration Law, enacted in 192o.53 It provides
that agreements to arbitrate existing disputes and arbitration clauses in contracts shall be "valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract" ;54 requires
the courts to stay actions brought in violation of a submission or of an arbitration clause;" and prescribes a procedure for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, providing that the trial court of general jurisdiction, upon
application of the party aggrieved, after due service on the other party and
"upon being satisfied that the making of the contract or submission or the
failure to comply therewith is not in issue, 56

.

.

.

shall make an order

directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms
of the contract or submission". 5 ' Provision is also made in the statute for
appointment of arbitrators by the court if no method of selection is provided
for in the arbitration agreement or "if a method be provided and any party
.

.

.

shall fail to avail himself of such method".5 8 An ill-drawn amend-

ment to the statute, enacted in 1927, validates ex parte arbitrations when
provided for in an arbitration agreement.59 An award of arbitrators may
SI. But cf. TEx. CoaPL.ET' STAT. (1928) § 232, providing for the court appointment of
an umpire if the arbitrators appointed by the parties disagree as to the choice thereof.
52. See SmaGEs, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 1-6; Note (1932) 46 HARv. L. REV. 314; Phillips, supra note 47, at 592-598. Such statutes have not ordinarily been held to make arbitration agreements irrevocable by implication. In Colorado and Washington, however, general
arbitration statutes have been relied upon in deciding, contrary to the common law rule, that
the breach of an arbitration clause in a contract bars a suit on the contract by the party in
default under the arbitration clause. Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean & Elevator Co., 76 Colo.
409, 232 Pac. 68o (i9z5), (1925) 23 MIcH. L. REv. 911; Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v.
Purcell Safe Co., 81 Wash. 592, 142 Pac. 1153 (1914). And in Washington an award may be
made although the authority of the arbitrators has been "revoked" by a party to the arbitraCf. STURGES,
tion. State ex rel. Fancher v. Everett, 144 Wash. 592, 258 Pac. 486 (1927).
supra note 2, § 76.
op. cit.
53. N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) C. 2. See also N. Y. Civ. PRAcrica Acr (Cahill,
1931) art. 84.
54. N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW (1920) § I.
55. Id. § 5.
56. If "the making of the contract or submission or the default be in issue", the court
"shall summarily proceed to the trial thereof", and either party may demand a jury trial. If
the jury [or, inferentially, the court-cf. Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law (933)
46 HARV. L. REv. 1258, I266, note 443 finds that there was a contract for arbitration and that
there is default thereunder, the court "shall make an order summarily directing the parties to
proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof". N. Y. ABITRATION LAW
(1920) § 3.

57. N. Y.

ARBITRATION LAW (1920)

§ 3-

58. Id. § 4.
59. Id. § 4-a, added by N. Y. Laws 1927, c. 352, to overcome the effect of the decision in
Matter of Bullard v. Morgan H. Grace Co., 24o N. Y. 388, 148 N. E. 559 (1925). As to the
construction of § 4-a, see Matter of Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co.,
Inc., 253 N. Y. 382, 171 N. E. 579 (1930), (1930) 5 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 114, revlg 227 App.
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be vacated by the court only (i) when "procured by fraud, corruption or
undue means"; (2) when there was "evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators"; (3) when "the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing for cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy" 60 or of "any other misbehavior by which the rights of the parties have been prejudiced"; or (4)
when the arbitrators "have exceeded their powers" or imperfectly executed
them. 6 ' No provision is made for either voluntary or compulsory reference
to the court by the arbitrators of questions of law, and awards are not reviewable for errors of law on the part of the arbitrators. 6 2 When an award has
been made, either party may apply to the court to confirm, modify or vacate
it, and the court, unless vacating or modifying the award on one of the
grounds specified by the statute, must confirm it and enter judgment
thereon. 63 The net effect of the statutory procedure, "from the application to
the . .

.

[court], and the entry of an order appointing an arbitrator [or

directing the parties to proceed to arbitration], to and including the application for confirmation of the award made by the arbitrators,

.

.

.

[is] a

suit for the specific performance of the contract" 64 to arbitrate.
The constitutionality of the New York arbitration statute was upheld
by the Court of Appeals in latter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg,6'
against the claims that it violated the right to trial by jury, that it abridged
the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts, and that it impaired the obligation
of contracts; but the construction of the statute by the New York courts has,
Div. 90, 237 N. Y. Supp. iio (ist Dep't 1929). The case is discussed by Havighurst in Note
(i931) 25 ILL. L. REV. 804. Compare Curtis, A Comparison of the Recent ArbitrationStatutes
(1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 567, 568-569. No similar provision appears in the Draft State Arbitration Act, which has been enacted in several states. See note 78, infra. For the text of the
Draft Act see STUaGEs, op. cit. szpra note 2, at 977-982.
6o. This codifies the common law rule that an award will be set aside if the arbitrators
refuse to hear all the material evidence offered by the parties. See SruRaES, opL cit. supra
note 2, § 214, n. 88. As to whether the common law rules of evidence apply in arbitration
proceedings, see I WIGMoaRE, EvromEcE (2d ed. 1923) § 4e; Phillips, A PracticalMethod for
the Determzation of Business Fact (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 230, 240-245.
61. N. Y. Civ. PRAcTIcE AcT (Cahill, 1931) § 1457. Cf. id. § 1458, specifying the
grounds on which an award may be modified or corrected.
62. See C. Itoh & Co. v. Boyer Oil Co., ig App. Div. 881, 19f' N. Y. Supp. 290 (ISt
Dep't 1921) ; Everett v. Brown, 120 Misc. 349, 351, 198 N. Y. Supp. 462, 464 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
Cf. Liggett v. Torrington Building Co., 114 Conn. 425, 158 At. 617 (1932). See Phillips,
supra note 47, at 602-609.
63. See N. Y. CIv. PRActicE Act (Cahill, 1931) §§ 1456-1463.
64. Manton, J., in Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 29 F. (2d) 40, 43 (C. C. A.
2d, 1928). See also the remarks of Brandeis, J., in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264
U. S. 1o9, 11 (1924), and of Cardozo, C. J., in Matter of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg.
Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 297, 169 N. E. 386, 390 (1929). Cf. the discussion of what constitutes
specific performance of an arbitration contract, infra pp. 170-173.
65. 230 N. Y. 261, 13o N. E. 288 (1921), (1921) 6 CORN. L. Q. 432, (1921) i9 MicH. L.
Ray. 866. See also Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. lO9 (1924), discussed in
Note (1924) 10 VA. L. Ray. 638 (holding the New York arbitration statute applicable to
maritime contracts) ; Marine Transit Co. v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S. 263 (1932) (upholding the
United States Arbitration Act as applied to maritime contracts) ; Summer v. Mackay, io N.
J. Misc. 644 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (upholding the New Jersey arbitration statute) ; Katakura &
Co. v. Vogue Silk Hosiery Co., 307 Pa. 544, 161 Atl. 529 (1932) (upholding the Pennsylvania
arbitration statute).
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in the main, been restrictive. 6 Thus, the statute has been held inapplicable
to agreements for appraisals 6T and to arbitration provisions in collective
labor agreements providing for the revision of wage scales.6 Moreover, the
court has been astute to find that arbitrators have exceeded or wrongfully
exercised their powers. 69 Thus, an arbitration clause in a contract applicable
to "all disputes arising under this contract and in the performance of the
work thereunder" has been held inapplicable to a dispute arising out of a
breach of the contract; 7 0 and a clause applicable to "any controversy or difference of opinion . . . as to the construction of the terms and conditions
of this contract, or as to its performance" has been held not to permit the
arbitrators to award consequential damages. 71 Furthermore, wrongly it
would seem, the provision of the statute 72 that an award may be set aside for
"misbehavior" of the arbitrators "by which the rights of the parties have been
prejudiced" has been held applicable to a case where an arbitrator in the best
of good faith made an investigation of his own to determine a question of
fact as to the quality of certain merchandise, rather than relying on the conflicting testimony of witnesses called by the parties. The award in that case
73
was set aside without inquiry as to whether it was not in fact a fair one.
66. Cf. General Silk Importing Co. v. Gerseta Corp., 200 App. Div. 786, 79o, I94 N. Y.
Supp. 15, 18 (ist Dep't 1922), aff'd without opiniOn, 234 N. Y. 513, 138 N. E. 427 (1922). No
attempt is made in this paper fully to analyze the New York decisions under the statute, and
only a few of the more important decisions are even referred to. For more detailed discussions, see Popkin, Judicial Construction of the New York Arbitration Law of 192O (1926)
Ii CORN. L. Q. 329; Fraenkel, The New York Arbitration Law (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 623.
See also Phillips, supra note 56, at 1272-1278.
67. Matter of Fletcher, 237 N. Y. 440, 143 N. E. :48 (924), (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 98,
discussed in a valuable Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 809, 811-813. Accord: li re Thurston,
48 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 2d, i93i) ; Grote v. Stein, 99 Pa. Super. 556 (1930) ; Marcus v.
Safeguard Ins. Co., 77 Pirrs. L. J. 741 (Pa. C. P. 1929). See also Sturges, Arbitration under the New Pennsylvania ArbitrationStatute (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 345, 357-360. As
to the distinction between arbitrations and appraisals, see In re Carus-Wilson and Greene, L.
R. i8 Q. B. D. 7, 9, 1O (1886) ; STURGES, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 7-34. Cf. Bangor Say.
Bank v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 85 Me. 68, 77, 26 Atl. 991, 993 (1892).
68. Matter of Buffalo & Erie Ry., 25o N. Y. 275, 165 N. E. 291 (1929), (I929) 29 COL.
L. REv. 518, (1929) 42 HARV. L. REv. 821. Cf. Kaplan v. Bagrier, 12 D. & C. 693 (Pa. 1929).
This seems wise. Most modern American arbitration statutes, including the United States
Arbitration Act, are by their terms inapplicable to contracts to arbitrate labor disputes. See
STURGES, op. cit. supra note 2, § 32. Cf. LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 405. See also Sturges, supra note 67, at 346-349. Cf. Phillips, The Function of Arbitration in the Settlenmt of
Industrial Disputes (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 1366.
69. Cf. (1934) 47 -ARV. L. REv. 699.
70. See Matter of Young v. Crescent Development Co., 240 N. Y. 244, 247-248, 148 N. E.
510, 511-512 (1925). See also Matter of Collisha-v' v. Kroeger, 211 App. Div. So (924)
(repudiation of entire contract). But cf. Matter of General Footwear Corp. v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 252 N. Y. 577, 17o N. E. 149 (1929). See Webster v. Van Allen, 217 App.
Div. 219, 216 N. Y. Supp. 552 (4th Dep't 1926), (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 137, discussed in Phillips, Arbitration and Conflicts of Laws (1934) 19 CORN. L. Q. 197, 203-205; Matter of
Checker Cab Mfg. Corp. v. Heller, 241 N. Y. 148, 149 N. E. 333 (1925).
71. Matter of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 169 N. E. 386
(x929), discussed in Weidlich, A Test of Compulsory Arbitration in New York (1930) 4
CONN. BAR J. 95.

72. N. Y. Civ. PRACTicE Act (Cahill, 1931) § 1457 (3).
73. Stefano Berizzi Co. v. Krausz, 239 N. Y. 315, 146 N. E. 436 (1925), (1925) 34 YALE
L. J. 9o5. See Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial Arbitration (1927) 40 -ARv. L. REv. 929;
Phillips, supra note 6o, at 230-239; STURGES, op. cit. supranote 2, § 217. Cf. Matter of New-
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On the other hand, the decisions that the question of whether there was fraud
in the inducement of a contract containing an arbitration clause is not arbitrable 74 seem entirely sound.7 5 Litigation as to the effect of the statute and
as to the powers of arbitrators under various arbitration provisions in contracts and submissions has been extensive, and it can hardly be said that the
New York experience bears out the claims of the advocates of compulsory
arbitration that it is speedy, private, friendly and cheap.70 Too often the
effect has been not to substitute arbitration for litigation, but to substitute
77
arbitration and litigation for litigation alone.
Statutes very similar to the New York Arbitration Law have been
enacted by ten other states 78 and by the federal government,7 9 and have been
pressed for enactment elsewhere by the American Arbitration Association,
which has prepared and urged the enactment of a Draft State Arbitration
Act based on the New York model.8 0 A somewhat different type of arbitration statute has been recommended by the Conference of Commissioners
burger v. Rose,

228 App. Div. 526, 529, 240 N. Y. Supp. 436, 438 (1st Dep't I93O), aff'd without opnlion, 254 N. Y. 546, 173 N. E. 859 (1930).
In Stefano Berizzi Co. v. Krausz, supra, Cardozo, J., said (p. 319): "The new policy
[of enforcing arbitration agreements] does not mean that there is to be an inquisition rather
than a trial, and that evidence unknown to the parties and gatheredt without notice may be
made the basis of the judgment". And again (p. 320) : "What was contemplated [by the
parties and by the arbitration statute] was a hearing. What ensued was a default". Might
not the learned judge better have said (and would not a scientist or an intelligent business man
-indeed, anyone other than a lawyer, and a common law lawyer at that-have said) : "The
new policy means that there is to be an impartial searching after the truth by the arbitrator,
who is authorized to make any investigations for this purpose that a scientist or an intelligent
business man would make, rather than that there must be a formal 'trial' or 'hearing'. What
was contemplated by the parties and by the arbitration statute was an untrammelled investigation to ascertain the truth of the matter in controversy, and that is just the sort of investigation which the arbitrator made". With all respect, it would seem that the court's talk of "inquisition" and "default" must be put down to the apparently instinctive prejudice of the common law judge and lawyer against methods of ascertaining facts other than the method of a
trial in court or something substantially like it.
74. Matter of Cheney Bros. v. Joroco Dresses, 218 App. Div. 652, 219 N. Y. Supp. 96
(1926), rev'd on another ground, 245 N. Y. 375, 157 N. E. 272 (1927) ; Matter of Ermolieff
v. Liss, 140 Misc. 214, 25o N. Y. Supp. 235 (Sup. Ct. 1931). See also Goldberg v. Mackay,
107 N. J. L. 412, 153 Atl. 639 (ig3i). Cf. ARBiTRATIoN AcT, 1934, 24 & 25 GEo. V, c. 14,
§ 14 (2).
75. See Phillips, supra note 56, at 1270-1272. But cf. Parsell, Arbitration of Fraud in
the Inducement of a Contract (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 351; [Sturges] Note (1927) 36 YALE
L. J. 866.
76. See Phillips, supra note 56, passim (especially at 1279).
77. See Isaacs, Book Review (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 149; Poor, Arbitration lnder the Federal Statute (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 667, 669-670.
78. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. (Deering, 1931) §§ 1280-1293, enacted in 1927; CoNN. GEN.
STAT. (1930) c. 302, enacted in 1929; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) §§ 405-420, enacted in
1928; N. H. Laws 1929, c. 147; N. J. ComP. STAT. (Supp. 1924) §§ 9-21 to 9-36, enacted in
1923; OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Baldwin, Supp. 1932) §§ 1248-I to 12148-19, enacted in 1931;
ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §§ 21-101 to 21-113, enacted in 1929, as amended by Ore. Laws
1931, c. 36; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 5, §§ 161-179, enacted in 1927; R. I. Laws
1929, c. 1408; WIs. STAT. (iith ed. 1931) c. 298, enacted in 1931.
79. 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-15 (1927). See Marine Transit Co. v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S. 263 (1932) ; The United States ArbitrationAct and Its Application (1925) 11
A. B. A. J. 153; Note (1925) 25 CoL L. REv. 822; Cohen and Dayton, The New Federal
Arbitration Law (1926) 12 VA. L. REv. 265; Note (1926) 4 HAxv. Bus, REV. 236; Poor,
supranote 77; Baum and Pressman, The Enforcement of ConminercialArbitration Agreenwnts
in the Federal Courts (1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 428-445.
8o. For the text of the Draft Act, see SruxEs, op. cit. supra note 2, 977-982.
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on Uniform State Laws and approved by the American Bar Association.8 1
The Uniform Arbitration Act 82 so recommended has been adopted in four
states. s3 It differs from the New York statute and the Draft Act in three
important respects: (i) It applies only to agreements to arbitrate existing
disputes. (2) It does not provide for court orders directing the parties to
an agreement to arbitrate "to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the agreement"; but it does provide for court appointment of arbitrators where one party to a submission does not do so or where an arbitrator
fails or is unable to act, and, as under the New York act, arbitrators may
under certain circumstances act ex parte. (3) It provides for voluntary
reference of questions of law to the court at the option of the arbitrators and
for compulsory reference at the request of a party, resembling in this respect
the English Arbitration Act. 4 Finally, Massachusetts has a statute which
applies to arbitration clauses in contracts as well as to submissions and which
provides for reference to the court of questions of law, but which does not
provide for orders directing arbitration, although authorizing court appointment of arbitrators to a limited extent. s 5 Experience with compulsory arbitrations in Massachusetts and in the states which have adopted the Uniform
Act is not yet sufficient to make possible a satisfactory study of the relative
merits in practice of these types of arbitration statutes as compared with each
other and with the New York and Draft Act type.
May it be said that these various statutes provide, within their respective
limitations, for the specific performance of contracts to arbitrate? So far
as the statutes of the New York and Draft Act type are concerned, it would
seem at first glance that the answer was obviously in the affirmative. These
statutes provide expressly for court orders requiring the parties "to proceed
to arbitration in accordance with their agreement". Is not this decreeing
direct specific performance? Clearly yes, if compliance with such an order
81. See Sturges, Arbitration under the New North CarolinaArbitrationStatute-The Uniform ArbitrationAct (1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 363-377. The debate in the American Bar Association as to whether to approve the proposed Uniform Act, after having successfully pressed
for the passage of the very different United States Arbitration Act, is reported in (1925)
ii A. B. A. J. 612-614. Compare the criticism of the Uniform Arbitration Act by the Association's Committee on Commerce Trade and Commercial Law in its report entitled The
United States Arbitration Act and Its Application, supra note 79. See also Sayre, Developwnt of Commercial Arbitration Law (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 595, 616-617.
82. For the text of the Uniform Act, see STURGES, op. cit. supranote 2, 983-987.
83. Nay. ComP. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) §§ 510-534, enacted in 1925; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) art 43-A, enacted in 1927; UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (933) c. 36, enacted in
1927; Wvo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1931) c. 7, enacted in 1927. Cf. ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933)
c. io, enacted in 1917; note 5o, supra.

84. Cf. the limited provisions for references to the court of matters of law in the statutes
of two of the states which in the main follow the New York and Draft Acts. CONN. GEN.
STAT. (1930) § 5847; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 5, § 177.
85. MAsS. GEN. LAws (Ter. ed. 1932) c. 251. (Sections 12 to 22, relating to arbitration
clauses in contracts, were added in 1925). See Grinnell, The Function of the Superior Court
in Regard to Awards under the Massachusetts ComnwrcWl Arbitration Act of 1925 (1926)
II MAss. L. Q., No. 5, 4.
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may be compelled by imprisonment for contempt, sequestration, and such
other means as are available to enforce decrees for specific performance in
other types of cases. On the other hand, if the only sanction behind such an
order is the court's power to appoint arbitrators if a party fails or refuses
to do so, the question of whether these statutes provide for the specific performance of arbitration contracts is the same as that which arises under the
English and Uniform Arbitration Act type of statute, presently to be considered. On the authorities, it is an open question whether or not an order
to proceed to arbitration under the New York and Draft Act type of statute
is enforceable, by contempt proceedings or otherwise, directly against the
party in default. No judicial decision or pronouncement on the point appears to exist, nor does the question appear to have been discussed by legal
writers.
It may first be noted that both the New York and the Draft Acts are
silent as to how an order "directing that. . . arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in .

.

.

[the] agreement" to arbitrate, or "directing

the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement" Il is to be enforced, except for the provision that "if a method
[of naming or appointing an arbitrator or umpire] be provided [in the arbitration agreement] and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such
method . . . then upon the application of either party . . . the court
. . . shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as

the case may require"., 7 This mode of enforcement by court appointment
of arbitrators seems clearly enough available if a party fails or refuses to
comply with an order directing him "to proceed to arbitration"; is it the
only method of enforcing such an order? On the one hand, it may be urged
that the legislature has set up a self-contained statutory scheme for the enforcement of arbitration agreements; that an ample statutory sanction is made
available; and that courts should not, without clear legislative authority and
direction, take it upon themselves to supply a sanction other than that which
the legislature has expressly provided, especially when that additional sanction involves the possibility of imprisonment of the defendant under circumstances where such imprisonment would not have been ordered under classical
equity practice and has not been directly authorized by statute. On the other
hand, it may be argued that the legislature has declared a policy in favor of
the enforcement of arbitration agreements, which the courts should endeavor
to effectuate by all appropriate means at their disposal; that what the legislature has really provided for by the statutory procedure is "a suit for the spe86. N. Y. ARBITRATIoN LAw (192o)
provisions appear in the UNITED STATES

C. A. §4 (1927).

§ 3; DRAFT STATE ARBrrRATiON
ARBrrRATioN Acr §4, 43 STAT.

Acr § 3. The same
883 (1925), 9 U. S.

87. N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW (1920) §4; DRAFT STATE ARmITRA ON AcT § 4. The same
provision appears in the Uwim STATES ARBITRAToN AcT § 5, 43 STAT. 883 (925), 9 U. S.
C. A. §4 (1927).
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cific performance of . . . [any] contract" Isto arbitrate, in which the ordi-

nary sanctions for the enforcement of decrees of specific performance may be
employed; and that, without express legislative authority, enforcement by
contempt proceedings and other appropriate equitable means is proper whenever a new sort of equitable decree is authorized, unless some statutory or
constitutional prohibition 89 interferes. The opinion may be ventured that
the former argument may well prove the more persuasive, especially in view
of the circumstance that the statutes under discussion provide for mandatory
rather than discretionary specific enforcement of arbitration agreements,"0
so that the courts may well say: "Since the legislature requires us specifically
to enforce all valid contracts to arbitrate, we will do so; but we will do so
only by the means which the legislature itself has provided for such enforcement. Only if we are allowed to exercise our jurisdiction in our accustomed
way, will we apply our own remedies". 91
The English Arbitration Act and the Uniform Arbitration Act do not
authorize orders directing arbitration, but do authorize the court appointment
of arbitrators; and, for the reasons just outlined, it may well be that the
New York and Draft Acts will be held not to be substantially different in
practical effect. Can such a procedure, under which the court cannot make
and enforce orders directly compelling recalcitrant parties to arbitrate, but
can bring about arbitrations binding upon recalcitrant parties by appointing
arbitrators for them, properly be regarded as involving the specific performance of arbitration contracts? There have been suggestions that it cannot;9'2 but this seems too narrow a view. To be sure, to enforce a contract to arbitrate by appointing an arbitrator for the party in default is
specific enforcement cy pres rather than direct specific enforcement; but this
involves nothing unusual. Such cy pres enforcement is no less specific performance than is enforcement of a contract to convey land by a decree
operating in rem either directly or through a master's deed, 93 or enforcement
88. Cf. note 64, supra. See also N. Y. AR~rrRATIo LA-w (192o) § 2, providing that a
contract to arbitrate "shall be valid, enforcible and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract". The same provision is contained in the UNITED STATES ARBITRATiox AcT § 2, 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 'U.S. C. A. § 2
(1927), and in the DRAFT STATE ARBiTRATION AcT § 2.
89. Such, e. g., as one forbidding imprisonment for debt. See People ex rel. Sarlay v.
Pope, 23o App. Div. 649, 246 N. Y. Supp. 414 (1930); Note (1933) 31 MIcE. L. REv. 731.
No difficulty of this sort would appear to arise in connection with the enforcement of decrees
compelling arbitration.
go. Cf. note 99, infra.
91. As to the desirability of providing for discretionary rather than mandatory specific
performance of arbitration agreements, see pp. 174-175, infra.
92. See, e. g., Fletcher Moulton, L. J., in Dolman & Sons v. Ossett Corp., [19121 3 K. B.
257, at 268; Sturges, op. cit. supra note 8I, at 392-393. But cf. SrTRcEs, supra note 2, § 147.
93. See Note on Legislation Extending the Power of Equity to Transfer Property, I
CHAFEE AND SIMPsON , CASES ON EpuIr (1934) 70-76; Garfein v. Mclnnis, 248 N. Y. 261,
162 N. E. 73 (1928). As to decrees in rem in the absence of statutory authority therefor,
see Tennant's Heirs v. Fretts, 67 W. Va. 569, 68 S. E. 387 (igio) ; Bush v. Aldrich, io S.
C. 491, 96 S. E. 922 (igi8) ; but cf. Silver Camp Mining Co. v. Dickert, 31 Mont. 488, 78 Pac.
967 (1904).
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of a construction contract by authorizing the plaintiff to do the work at the
defendant's expense,9 4 or enforcement of a contract requiring continuous
performance by appointing a receiver to carry out the contract. 5 It may
fairly be said, therefore, that the English Arbitration Act and the American
statutes of the Uniform Arbitration Act type as well as those of the New
York and Draft Act type (however the latter may be construed), do provide
for the specific performance of such arbitration agreements as fall within
their respective purviews.
Statutory specific enforcement of arbitration contracts in England has
proved tolerably satisfactory, but (although experience in this country with
compelled arbitration is not yet sufficient for a final judgment) this can hardly
be said to have been true in the United States.90 Much of the difficulty in this
country appears to have arisen from two causes: (i) Parties and their counsel
have frequently failed to realize that, while arbitration is an excellent means
of settling disputes as to relatively simple questions of fact, it may well be
quite unsatisfactory as a method of deciding questions of ultimate liability
involving complex legal relations. An ideal case for arbitration is one involving, say, the question whether certain goods are of sample quality, or are
merchantable. Here the business-man arbitrator, expert in his trade, can
decide far better than judge or judge and jury, especially if he is not limited
to hearing witnesses in arriving at his conclusions. On the other hand, to
submit to arbitration a question of ultimate liability involving complex questions of law will usually result in a compromise decision, based on rather naive
general ideas of "fairness", which is "but rusticitm judiciun"."7 This difficulty may be eliminated, for the most part, by careful drafting and intelligent
limitation of arbitration clauses in contracts 98 and by the submission to
arbitration of only such existing disputes as are suitable for arbitral decision.
Moreover, the difficulty is less serious in those jurisdictions which provide
for reference to the courts of questions of law arising in the course of an
arbitration. (2) Modern American arbitration statutes have been regarded
94. See Village of Larchmont v. Larchmont Park, 185 App. Div. 330, 173 N. Y. Supp.
32 (igi8), and the discussion of that case in Pound, Progressof the Law, i9i8-919--Equity
(1920) 33 HARV. L. REV. 420, 436. Cf. FEDERAL EQurry RuLE 8, 28 U. S. C. A. 12 (1927).
As to when construction contracts are specifically enforceable, see Brummel v. Clifton Realty
Co., 146 Md. 56, 125 Atl. 905 (1924) ; Zygmunt v. Avenue Realty Co., io8 N. J. Eq. 462, 155
Cf. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. White County, 52 F. (2d) io65 (C.
Atl. 544 (931).
C. A. 6th, i931).
95. See Schmidtz v. Louisville & Nashville R R., ioi Ky. 441, 484, 41 S. W. 1015, 102-7-

1o28 (1897) ; Kearns-Gorsuch Bottle Co. v. Hartford-Fairmont Co., i F. (2d) 318, 320 (S.
D. N. Y. 1921). As to when contracts requiring continuous performance are specifically enforceable, see Notes (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 348; (1927) 5 TEX. L. REV. 203.
96. Cf. notes 76, 77, supra. But cf. Grossman, Trade Security under ArbiNtration Laws

(1926) 35 YALE L. J. 3o8; Baum and Pressman, supra note 79, at 246-253.
97. Story, J., in Tobey v. County of Bristol, 3 Story 8oo (C. C. D. Mass. 1845), cited
note 1o, supra, at 822. See the penetrating discussion in Stone, The Scope and Limitations of
Commercial Arbitration (924) 1o PRo. AcAD. PoL ScI. 501.
98. Cf. YER BOOK, Assx. OF THE BAR OF THE CiTY OF Nmv Yopx 1925, 275-276.
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as imposing upon the courts a mandatory "duty to enforce" 99 arbitration
agreements. The English Arbitration Act gives the court discretion as to
whether or not to stay an action brought in violation of an arbitration
clause, 100 and the same discretion should, it would seem, exist with regard to
the specific performance of arbitration agreements. In many cases, specific
enforcement of such agreements is unquestionably proper, but in others the
balance of convenience may well tip the other way; substantial justice
will be better attained, not by compelling the courts specifically to enforce
all agreements to arbitrate, but by authorizing them to enforce such an
[thinks] it a proper case for its being so
agreement "if the court . .
enforced". 0
It may be objected that to give the courts discretion to grant or refuse
specific performance of contracts to arbitrate in the light of the circumstances
of each particular case would be to introduce a capricious and unpredictable
factor into the law. But there are two answers to this objection: (i) The
discretion which would thus be vested in the courts would not be an arbitrary
individual discretion, but a judicial discretion to be exercised in accordance
with well settled principles.' 0 2 (2) Courts of equity have long exercised
this discretion in granting or refusing specific relief in other classes of cases,
without any such unfortunate results. The standards of judicial discretion
in specific performance cases have been developed and applied in thousands
of decisions; the necessary adherence of the courts to those standards in
cases where specific enforcement of arbitration contracts is sought will
prevent capriciousness and unpredictability. On the other hand, such a
discretion must be preserved to the courts if a system involving compulsory
arbitrations is to operate satisfactorily. If arbitration is to be compelled
in every instance even though it is unjust in the particular case to hold the
party who is compelled to arbitrate to the letter of his bond, the whole
arbitral scheme may well be brought into disrepute. And there can be no
doubt that such cases of injustice can and do arise. For example, it has
become the practice of some business organizations to insert, in standardized
"take-it-or-leave-it" contracts, onerous arbitration clauses, frequently coupled with "provisions no court would enforce but which arbitrators invariably
do".' 0 3 Unless, as has been suggested,' 04 it is to be provided by statute that
"no party to an arbitration shall be entitled to rely, against the wishes of his
99. Cardozo, C. J., in Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 23o N. Y. 261, 274, 130
Cf. Note (934) 47 HARV. L. Rzv. 1036, lO4O-lO42. As an original
question of statutory interpretation, it may well be doubted whether such a construction, even
of statutes of the New York and Draft Act type, is a necessary one.
Ioo. See Bristol Corp. v. John Aird & Co., [19131 A. C. 241, 257. Cf. Metropolitan
Tunnel & Public Works, Ltd. v. London Electric Ry., [I926] Ch. 371, 388-390.
ioi. Lord Moulton in Bristol Corp. v. John Aird & Co., [1913] A. C. 241, 257.
102. See Note on Discretion in Granting Specific Performance. 2 CHAF-E AND SIMPSON,
N. E. 288, 291 (1921).

op. cit. supra note 93, 1270-1271.
103. Phillips, supra note 56, at 1274.
104- Nordon, Arbitration (1926) 162 L. T. 262.
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opponent, on an arbitration clause upon which the former insists as part of
the standard contract on which he transacts business", the question of
whether it is fair and equitable to enforce such a clause in each particular
case should at least be left to the judicial discretion of the courts, guided by
the standards developed in the long line of equity decisions involving attempts
specifically to enforce improvident and unfair contracts against defendants
who will suffer hardship if specific relief is granted. 10 5 Similarly, where
arbitration becomes inequitable by reason of events not anticipated by the
parties which occur after the agreement to arbitrate is made, familiar principles are available to guide the courts in deciding whether to compel the
parties specifically to perform their agreement, 10 6 and justice will be promoted
if the courts are permitted to exercise their discretion in accordance with
those principles.
In the past, the basic difficulty, in the absence of statute, in the specific
enforcement of contracts to arbitrate has lain, as has been pointed out,1o 7 in
the fact that such contracts were regarded at law as "revocable", so that the
authority of arbitrators duly appointed could be revoked so as to prevent an
award. This difficulty can be, and in many jurisdictions has been, removed
by legislative changes of the common law rule.' 08 The other supposed practical difficulties-inability of the equity court to enforce a decree compelling
arbitration, and the like-have been unduly magnified by the courts, 0 9 and
the effect of the early decisions raising those alleged difficulties can readily
be removed by a statutory declaration that a court of equity may, in its
judicial discretion, 10 decree specific performance of arbitration contracts,
and may, if necessary to make arbitration effective, appoint arbitrators. Such
a discretion, wisely exercised, should result in the specific enforcement of
contracts to arbitrate where justice will be promoted thereby, and, per contra,
would render it unnecessary for the courts, under the guise of construction
of arbitration statutes and agreements, to deny specific performance on
spurious grounds in order to avoid results regarded by them as unfair."'
Whether or not legislation should provide that the proceedings of arbitrators
xo5. See 5 PomERor, op. cit. supra note 35, § 2211 (improvident contracts) ; Note (1930)
65 A. L. R. 7, 75-77 (collects cases both ways) ; PoMRtoY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
(3d ed. 1926) § '79 (unfairness). See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrs (1932) § 367. Specific
performance of a contract may well be denied on such grounds, although the defendant has
no case for rescission. See, e. g., Mansfield v. Sherman, 8I Me. 365, 367-368, 17 Atl. 300, 301302 (1889) ; Rennyson v. Rozell, io6 Pa. 407, 412 (884).
io6. See Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557 (U. S. i869) ; PoMERoY, SPECrIC PERFORMAN CE
(3d. ed. 1926) 458n-459n.
io7. See pp. 162-64, supra.
Io8. See supra, p. 164, and notes 53 and 78.
iog. See p. i6i, supra.
iio. Compare the provision in the SA.Ls Acr § 68, that a court of equity may, at the
suit of the buyer, decree the specific performance of a contract for the sale of a chattel "if
it thinks fit". Cf. Hughbanks v. Browning, 9 Ohio App. 114, ii6 (1917).
III. Cf. p. I68, supra; Phillips, supra note 56, at 1272-1278.
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are to be controllable by the courts in matters of law 112 will depend upon the
view taken by the legislature as to the function of arbitration-whether it is
regarded as a method of trial or as a substitute for trial."13 Assuming that
care is exercised in stipulating what disputes are to be submitted to arbitration, and given discretion in the courts to refuse specific performance of
contracts to arbitrate where, in the court's opinion, injustice is likely to result,
there would seem to be no controlling reason for not permitting the parties, if
they so desire, to make arbitrators final judges of matters of law as well as
of matters of fact, although a clear and specific expression of such an intention might well be required. Nor does there seem substantial ground, granted
these circumstances, for not extending specific performance to arbitration
provisions in contracts relating to future disputes thereunder as well as to
submissions of existing disputes,1 4 and to appraisals as well as to arbitrations
115
proper.
The future development of the law as to the specific performance of
arbitration contracts will proceed largely through legislation. That legislation, if it is to contribute its maximum to the realization of the great potentialities of arbitration as a speedy, friendly, cheap and effective means of
settling business controversies, must be drafted with a realistic appreciation
of the limitations of the arbitral process and with a recognition of the
importance of preserving a margin of judicial discretion in the granting and
refusing of specific performance of contracts to arbitrate similar to that
which exists with regard to the specific enforcement of other types of contracts.
112. As, e. g., in England, Massachusetts and the states which have adopted the Uniform
Arbitration Act.
113. See Isaacs, supra note 73.
114. Cf. pp. 170, 173, supra.
I15. Cf. note 67, supra.

